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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
lacked the capacity to understand the physical nature and conse-
quences of his conduct: and (2) whether, because of such dis-
ease, the defendant lacked the capacity to realize that it was
morally wrong to commit the harm in question.2
This test, like the American Law Institute test, is much like the
M'Naghten test, but meets the criticism of not bearing on control of
a man's conduct, that is often directed at the latter.
The test laid out by the Wisconsin Court in the Esser case, when
properly interpretated, is geared to accomplishing the same thing. As
such, it is typical of the developments in this area of the law. Further
developments are sure to take place along the same line, and due to
the perplexity of the problems in the area, one can do no more than
wait and see what course they will follow.
DAVID A. SUEMNICK
Negligence: The Sleeping Driver's Negligence as a Matter of
Law-The defendant Louis Shepherd, having participated in the senior
class play, attended a party at the home of one of the members of the
cast. There was some liquor served at the party, but there was no
evidence that anyone became intoxicated. About 3:00 A.M. the party
broke up and five girls, including the plaintiff, got into Shepherd's
car for the ride home. About four miles from the party the car left
the road, hit a tree, and the plaintiff was injured.
The trial court found for the plaintiff, apportioning 95% of the
negligence to defendant. The defendant appealed the decision on the
theory that he had fallen asleep without warning and that he was not
liable for his actions while asleep. The supreme court held that falling
asleep while driving is negligence as a matter of law.'
In reaching this decision the court reasoned that falling asleep is
attended by premonitory warnings or is to be expected from prior
activities and experience. "We ... hold that falling asleep at the wheel
is negligence as a matter of law because no facts can exist which will
justify, excuse or exculpate such negligence." 2
Prior to this decision Wisconsin had adopted the majority view
that was first enunciated by the supreme court of Connecticut in
Bushnell v. Bushnell, where it was stated:
(T)he mere fact of his going to sleep while driving is a
proper basis for an inference of negligence sufficient to make
out a prima facie case, and sufficient for a recovery, if no cir-
cumstances tending to excuse or justfy his conduct are proven.
21 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L. J. 761, 781 (1956).
I Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mutual Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W. 2d 140
(1962).
2 Id. at 98, 118 N.W. 2d at 144.
3 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925).
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RECENT DECISIONS
In order to overcome this inference the defendant was required
to show that as a careful and cautious man he could not have foreseen
that he was about to fall asleep. Such evidence had to be of a real and
tangible nature, and not be vague or fanciful.4 In the case of Krantz
v. Krants& Wisconsin apparently restricted such evidence to fainting
spells and unanticipated mental or physical conditions resulting in
sleep. Some of the circumstances considered by courts in deciding
cases of this nature were lack of sleep, length of time at wheel, pres-
ence of premonitory symptoms, driving under the influence of liquor,
and strenuous activities before driving.
6
By virtue of this decision Wisconsin has eliminated unanticipated
sleep as a possible defense in automobile accident cases. The court
did preserve the defense of loss of consciousness resulting from injury
inflicted by an outside force or from fainting, heart attack, or epileptic
seizure.' However, in view of prior Wisconsin cases that dealt with
the question of the sleeping motorist, it. is doubtful whether this
decision has changed the law in its practical end result. In no instance,
in Wisconsin or elsewhere, has a driver who fell asleep at the wheel
been absolved of liability for ordinary negligence., In Wisconsin Na-
tural Gas Co. v. Employers Mutual Liability Ins. Co.9 the defendant
had driven a total of 269 miles. On three occasions he had stopped to
rest, and twice he had slept. The supreme court affirmed the directed
verdict of the trial court which had found the defendant negligent as
a matter of law. The court based its decision on the rationale of Eleason
v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.10 that a person who is aware of the
fact that he is subject to spells of unconsciousness (here it was epileptic
seizures) was negligent as a matter of law in driving. The Wisconsin
court has also held that a guest has assumed the risk as a matter of
law when he rode with a driver who fell asleep.Y
4 Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Hunter, 41 Del. 336, 21 A.2d 286 (1941).
5 211 Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 155 (1933).
6 Annot., 28 A.L.R. 2d 12, 25 (1953).
7 Supra note 1.
8 Supra note 6, at 24.9263 Wis. 633, 58 N.W. 2d 424 (1952).
10254 Wis. 134, 35 N.W. 2d 301 (1948).
"1Krueger v. Krueger, 197 Wis. 588, 222 N.W. 784 (1929); Markovich v.
Schlafke 230 Wis. 639, 284 N.W. 516 (1939). The defense of assumption of
risk in automobile host-guest cases was abolished in Wisconsin by McCon-
vile v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 15 Wis. 2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14
(1962).
The Thesien case did not expressly convert the assumption of risk to
contributory negligence as a matter of law, but it did suggest it: "However,
when the guest's negligence in riding with the host consists of exposing him-
self to a hazard which is found to be causal negligence on the part of the
host, the guest's negligence would necessarily be a cause of his injuries."
(emphasis added) 18 Wis. 2d. 91, 104, 118 N.W.2d. 140, 147 (1962). Such a
determination does not result in an absolute bar to recovery as was true of
assumption of risk. It merely renders the issue of the guest's right to re-




In only one reported Wisconsin case in which the defendant relied
on unanticipated sleep as a defense has the question of his negligence
been submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff.1 2 In view of these prior decisions the Theisen case seems to
be merely the expression of a judicial opinion that the theoretical
facts that could excuse a sleeping motorist do not in fact exist.
Other methods of treating automobile accident cases and the sleep-
ing motorist have been suggested and employed. Texas imposes strict
liability for violation of safety statutes. In a case where the defendant
alleged that he was suddenly attacked by some ailment which rendered
him unconscious and therefore unable to control his car, the court held
that the mere fact that he was on the wrong side of the road subjected
him to liability. 13 It has been suggested that the sleeping motorist be
treated as engaged in ultrahazardous activity.14
It is a practical impossibility to determine how many cases in-
volving a sleeping driver have reached the jury, or resulted in a verdict
for the defendant at the trial court level. However, the mere possi-
bility of such an eventuality has a practical value in that it can be
employed as a tool in reducing damage figures in settlement proceed-
ings. The elimination of the defense of unanticipated sleep, however
weak it may have been, should result in more equitable settlements
for injured plaintiffs.
The social policy underlying the decision in the Theisen case is
sound. An automobile in motion is unquestionably a dangerous instru-
mentality and a driver should be compelled to employ every available
precaution to prevent injury to others. Certainly falling asleep while
driving is not an act of caution. Although no driver has heretofore
excused himself from liability by alleging sleep, this decision eliminates
the possibility that in future cases such a driver may be exonerated. By
requiring a finding of negligence as a matter of law the case is kept free
from the speculation of the jurors.
PAUL SCHWEMER
12 Krantz v. Krantz, supra note 5.
13 Leary v. Oates, 84 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). The statute relied
on was Vernon's Penal Code §801 (A) (B). Wisconsin Statutes (1961) §§346.05
and 346.13 are similar in their language, but they have not been interpreted as
imposing strict liability.
14 Paul D. Kaufan and Benjamin E. Kantrowitz, The Case of the Sleeping
Motorist, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 362 (1950). "There is then, an ultra-hazardous
activity, not that of driving an automobile, but that of remaining constantly
capable of driving. It is the driver who has brought the car to the road, who
has propelled and guided the engine and who owes the other highway users
the absolute duty to stay awake while he drives."
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